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No net loss is a buzz phrase in environmental policy. Applied to a multitude of 19 
environmental targets, like biodiversity, wetlands, and land productive capacity, no net loss 20 
(NNL) and related goals have been adopted by multiple countries and organisations, but these 21 
goals often lack clear reference scenarios: no net loss compared to what? Here, we examine 22 
policies with NNL and related goals, and identify three main forms of reference scenario. We 23 
categorise NNL policies as relating either to overarching policy goals, or to responses to 24 
specific impacts. We explore how to resolve conflicts between overarching and impact-25 
specific NNL policies, and improve transparency about what NNL-type policies are actually 26 
designed to achieve. 27 
Keywords: baselines, environmental offsets, compensatory conservation, conservation 28 
policy, counterfactuals, land degradation neutrality, mitigation, no net loss, reference 29 
scenarios 30 
  31 
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As humanity struggles and fails to stay within a safe operating space 
1,2
, an increasingly 32 
influential principle in environmental management and policy is that of no net loss (NNL) 33 
(of biodiversity, carbon stocks, water quality, etc.), along with a family of related terms and 34 
concepts, such as Net Positive Impact, Zero Net Deforestation, and Net Gain (NG). The 35 
reference to net outcomes implies an assumption that natural resources, environmental quality 36 
or biodiversity will continue to be lost due to economic development and our increasing 37 
human footprint, and that residual losses should be counterbalanced in some way by 38 
equivalent gains elsewhere. If they live up to their stated goal, NNL and NG policies should 39 
help keep us or move us back to within planetary boundaries. 40 
No net loss and related goals have emerged for a broadening range of natural targets, from 41 
forest cover, biodiversity and fisheries, to land productive capacity and carbon. Since the  42 
term no net loss was first popularized during the 1988 United States presidential election 43 
campaign of George H.W. Bush 
3,4
, such goals increasingly have become embedded within 44 
international pledges 
5,6
, national and regional government policies 
7
 , voluntary corporate 45 
sustainability policy 
8
, and lending requirements for major financial institutions 
9
. For 46 
example, the European Commission is exploring policy options for a European Union-wide 47 
No Net Loss Initiative, and countries including France, Colombia and Peru have recently 48 
introduced legislation that includes such goals 
10,11
. Biodiversity offset policies which require 49 
NNL of biodiversity are now in place or enabled in over eighty countries
7
.  50 
No net loss of biodiversity or ecosystem services sounds like an appealing goal. However, the 51 
phrase is meaningless in isolation: that is, the goal is NNL compared to what? 
1214
. Policy 52 
goals like NNL must be specified relative to an alternative possible scenario: i.e., the 53 
reference scenarios for the aspect of the environment targeted by the policy, over time and 54 
space. Different reference scenarios against which NNL is to be achieved make for entirely 55 
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different intended outcomes for the environment. The question is, then: relative to what 56 
biophysical reference scenario is the NNL outcome sought 
12,14
?  57 
A given reference scenario against which one aims to achieve NNL is, in effect, the target 58 
outcome  and so the goal of policies that do not specify a reference scenario is unclear 
4
. In 59 
practice, such reference scenarios are rarely articulated 
13,15
. Thus, appropriate 60 
implementation of policies striving for NNL outcomes is undermined by an inability to 61 




Further, NNL and related terms are being used indiscriminately to describe what are actually 64 
two distinct policy goals: 1) an overarching goal with a broad scope, applying to all impacts 65 
(anthropogenic and natural, large and small) on the environmental target  across a 66 
jurisdiction, such as a commitment to achieve NNL of biodiversity by 2020 
16
 or zero net 67 
deforestation by 2015 
17
; and 2) an impact-specific policy goal based on a narrower scope 68 
such as counterbalancing losses from a particular category of development impacts using 69 
offsets
18
. Such impact-specific policies may be, but are not always, considered a way to help 70 
achieve overarching policy goals.
 
71 
Although the term no net loss is used in both cases, the reference scenario against which 72 
this is to be achieved can be very different. For example, biodiversity offset policies that have 73 
a goal of NNL tend to relate only to the component of loss caused by the particular impact in 74 
question (e.g. the removal of habitat to make way for an infrastructure project). Therefore, a 75 
successful NNL outcome in that instance can still mean that less biodiversity exists compared 76 
to before the impact, if we accept that biodiversity declines caused by factors other than the 77 
particular impact in question would have occurred 
13
. However, overarching policy goals 78 
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seem to imply a different scenario; for example, that declines in the targeted biodiversity will 79 
be halted, regardless of what is causing them.   80 
The indiscriminate and unqualified use of NNL to describe these very different (but 81 
interlinked) outcomes obscures policy debate and the capacity for evaluation. Further, the 82 
opacity about reference scenarios for such goals contributes to poor practice in estimating 83 
losses and gains 
15
 at both the level of particular impacts, and across landscapes or 84 
jurisdictions.  85 
In this contribution, we review and distinguish among the reference scenarios implied by 86 
NNL-type policies at overarching and impact-specific levels. We critically evaluate these 87 
reference scenarios in the context of different policy goals, and demonstrate the widely 88 
different outcomes that they imply for the environmental features they target (e.g., 89 
biodiversity). Finally, we examine the interaction between overarching NNL-type policies 90 
and impact-specific NNL policies, with practical guidance on how to ensure the two work in 91 
harmony, rather than conflict.  92 
 93 
Reference scenarios for no net loss 94 
A range of environmental features can form the target of NNL and related goals, including 95 
renewable natural resources, living nature and biodiversity, and measures of soil, air and 96 
water quality. For the sake of brevity throughout this paper, we collectively refer to these 97 
biophysical targets of NNL policies as natural capital, though we recognise the diversity of 98 
terms adopted across different jurisdictions and policy domains. Because framing goals in net 99 
terms implies exchanging losses and gains of the target natural capital, a central issue is the 100 
definition and measurement of what is to be traded. Determining an appropriate unit of 101 
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exchange is often a non-trivial challenge, especially for approaches that address features such 102 
as biodiversity or ecosystems that defy precise measurement and vary along a continuum in 103 
both space and time
7
. 104 
There are various reference scenarios that might feasibly apply in relation to NNL policy 105 
goals. Each scenario captures a different biophysical trend against which NNL is to be 106 
achievedand therefore, achieving NNL relative to each would mean a different outcome for 107 
the targeted natural capital. The reference scenario could be either fixed: for example, 108 
describing a present or future state of biodiversity; or dynamic: for example, representing a 109 
biodiversity trend over time 
13
. 110 
We consider three broad types of reference scenario implied by NNL policies and goals, both 111 
overarching and impact-specific (Figure 1). In this analysis, we focus on the conceptual basis 112 
behind the approaches, to reveal what they are designed to achieve if they work perfectly, 113 
notwithstanding the many practical challenges to policy effectiveness. 114 
 115 
A. No net loss relative to a fixed reference scenario 116 
Achieving NNL compared to the current state of natural capital or to some future state sets a 117 
cap on the amount of natural capital to be retained (e.g., a desired amount of forest retained). 118 
This means that the losses from development and gains from offset activities together result 119 
in natural capital being maintained at the level defined by the fixed reference scenario. For 120 
example, cap and trade systems have also been developed to address nutrient loads, which 121 
incentivize reductions in non-point contamination 
20
 or investments in increasing the 122 
assimilation capacity of ecosystems 
21
. Using a fixed state as a goal can improve certainty 123 
about the end-point of environmental decline 
22
. However, some goals are based on an 124 
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undefined state at a future point in time (e.g., achieving zero net deforestation by 2020 
6
) 125 
instead of a quantified fixed baseline in units of the target natural capital (e.g 100,000 126 
hectares of forest retained by 2020 and maintained thereafter). In such cases, the goal state 127 
remains uncertain, because it is not known how much loss will have occurred by the time the 128 
cap kicks in.  129 
Given the risks associated with over- or under-estimating future scenarios 
13,15
, some authors 130 
have argued that using a reference scenario fixed at an explicit, known state such as now or 131 
prior to the impact carries less risk, and has the added advantage of simplicity 
23
. Indeed, 132 
most non-specialists including public stakeholders likely presume this meaning of NNL (i.e., 133 
no further loss of biodiversity compared to what currently exists, whatever the cause of 134 
losses). For example, the goal of land degradation neutrality is to be achieved relative to 135 
2015, the year the approach was developed 
5
. Nevertheless, even the current state of natural 136 
capital is usually imperfectly known. 137 
Fixed reference scenarios could also, in effect, be aligned with desired targets that are 138 
higher or lower than the current state. For example, in South Africa, biodiversity offsets for 139 
the loss of vegetation types involve protection at a ratio of hectares protected to hectares lost 140 
such that, if all remaining vegetation was either lost to development or protected as an offset, 141 
the retention targets for each vegetation type will have been met
22
. Nevertheless, setting a 142 
reference scenario that reflects a further drawing-down of natural capital introduces 143 
challenges and risks, especially for the most vulnerable components of biodiversity or where 144 
thresholds have been crossed. The persistence of some biotafor example, of threatened 145 
species already precariously depletedmay depend on improvements to current habitat 146 
availability or quality 
24
; conversely, in other circumstances further decreases of biodiversity 147 
or forest may be possible without risking socially-unacceptable consequences. Therefore, 148 
designing tailored trading schemes that aim to achieve a future desired state for the target 149 
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biota is perhaps the most transparent and defensible approach to balancing biodiversity and 150 
development from a conservation perspective. Yet such an approach bears little resemblance 151 
to most current schemes intended to achieve NNL.  152 
A goal framed as no net loss compared to what we want to achieve is an awkward and 153 
arguably redundant formulation of the concept of more traditional conservation planning. It is 154 
often, however, a motivation for net gain goals for projects with impacts on particularly 155 
threatened species or habitats (e.g. under Performance Standard 6 of the International Finance 156 
Corporation). 157 
B. No net loss relative to a dynamic reference scenario excluding development  158 
Rather than placing a cap on the total amount of natural capital to be maintained, a reference 159 
scenario that changes through time may be specified, rather than a fixed state. For example, 160 
the IUCN policy on biodiversity offsets suggests they should be designed so as to achieve a 161 
NNL or net gain outcome relative to a reference scenario of what is likely to have occurred in 162 
the absence of the project and the offset
25
 (Figure 1). Such a reference scenario is called a 163 
counterfactual: what would have happened in the absence of some intervention/s 
7
. This 164 
counterfactual scenario will therefore depend on the broader policy context in the jurisdiction 165 
where the offset approach is being implemented.  166 
The use of such dynamic reference scenarios has obvious challenges: first, desired outcomes 167 
in terms of e.g. biodiversity conservation or land productive capacity often relate to states 168 
(e.g. 17% protected by 2020, halt population decline, maintain land productive capacity 169 
above 2015 levels), but policies with a dynamic reference scenario are obviously not 170 
designed to achieve a fixed state. Second, selecting what the reference scenario should be 171 
requires developing plausible and relatively detailed projections of future changea process 172 
challenging enough in itself, but which is made more difficult by the high risk of being 173 
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gamed given the stakes at play 
4,26,27
. Third, the appropriate rate of change might vary 174 
considerably spatially, among different biota, and over time, and so the challenge of ensuring 175 
the reference scenario remains plausible is ongoing.  176 
Similar challenges are common to any dynamic reference scenario 
28,29
, but the unique feature 177 
of a defensible reference scenario for NNL is that it must exclude any impacts that are the 178 
target of the policy itself, as well as any benefits that occur only because the policy itself 179 
requires them (e.g., benefits from offset actions). Only processes that are independent of the 180 
policy should be reflected in the reference scenario 
30
. So, this type of reference scenario is: a 181 
plausible pattern of change over time, but one that excludes the impact and any 182 
counterbalancing interventions. As such, this type of reference scenario is well suited to 183 
impact-specific policies, in which the objective is to achieve no net loss from the particular 184 
impacts covered by the policy. 185 
C. No net loss relative to a dynamic reference scenario including development  186 
Occasionally it is suggested that a suitable reference scenario may be what would have 187 
occurred if no NNL policy were introduced and economic development continued  a 188 
business as usual scenario. For example, South Australias Significant Environmental Benefit 189 
(SEB) policy states that offsets under the policy must achieve  an overall environmental 190 
gain … The gain in vegetation is considered against what would likely have occurred to the 191 
vegetation in the absence of the SEB being established… 
31
. Further, the REDD+ discussion 192 
is framed against achieving reductions in emissions compared to a business as usual scenario 193 
in which emissions continue to grow 
28,32
. However, such a reference scenario is nonsensical 194 
in the context of a NNL goal. Under this approach, a NNL policy becomes a non-policy: it 195 
endorses the same outcomes that would have occurred without the policy. It may be argued 196 
that a net gain goal (instead of NNL) could validly generate a benefit by pledging its 197 
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achievement against this baseline (à la REDD+), but this would mean any positive outcomes 198 
for biodiversity relative to business as usualhowever minutewould meet this low 199 
standard. Such a reference scenario allows one to claim that a net gain is achieved because 99 200 
hectares of forest was removed, rather than 100 hectares had there been no policy. 201 
Because of the nature of a NNL commitment, the reference scenario chosen is particularly 202 
crucial: it is the scenario that the policy is designed to achieve. As such, the outcome for 203 
biodiversity from a NNL policy with each of these types of reference scenario can be vastly 204 
different (Fig. 1). In the next section, we discuss the types of reference scenarios (and thus, 205 
outcomes) that are implied by both overarching and impact-specific policy goals, and argue 206 
for the use of particular types of reference scenarios in each case. 207 
 208 
NNL policies and their reference scenarios 209 
To explore the range of reference scenarios implied by existing NNL and related policies, we 210 
reviewed a series of prominent examples of policies (organisational, governmental) that 211 
reference no net loss, net gain, net positive impact, net neutrality, zero net deforestation, and 212 
related concepts. Policies were identified for review based on a search of the literature and 213 
the authors familiarity with NNL policies globally; the review was not intended to be 214 
exhaustive, but illustrative. We classified each policy as primarily overarching or impact-215 
specific (Table 1). For each, we identified the statement of the NNL goal, the target natural 216 
capital, and any explicit statement of the reference scenario for the policy goal in policy 217 
documentation. Where possible, we also explored published materials documenting the 218 
design implementation of the policy to infer implied reference scenarios. For example, 219 
regardless of any policy claims to the contrary, NNL biodiversity offset policies that allow 220 
losses to be exchanged for protection of existing biodiversity assume that protection provides 221 
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avoided losses, which implies an effective reference scenario of decline
13
. Finally, we 222 
classified the type of reference scenarios against which each policy aims to achieve its NNL 223 
goal (Figure 2). 224 
Table 1 summarises those policies for which we could confidently conclude a no net loss goal 225 
or similar was intended. We exclude those where this was unclear. For example, we have not 226 
included the example of US Species Conservation Banking as a NNL policy. It includes no 227 
explicit statement of intended net outcomes, although  its guidance states that the goal is to 228 
offset adverse impacts to [endangered] species, and offsetting is defined in global best-229 
practice guidance as achieving as at least a no net loss outcome 
25,33,34
. Nevertheless, an 230 
overall net loss in habitat extent is the most likely outcome of conservation banking, although 231 
banks themselves may be higher in quality than the habitat lost 
35,36
 .232 
From this analysis, it is clear that there can be mismatches between the stated reference 233 
scenario against which overarching NNL policies seeks to achieve their goals, and the way 234 
impact-specific policies operate. In some cases, the two conflict within the same jurisdiction 235 
(Figure 2). Although the Australian Native Vegetation Framework aims to increase the 236 
national extent and connectivity of native vegetation 
37
, the NNL offset policies employ 237 
reference scenarios of decline (in some cases, steep decline
13
) (Figure 2; Table 1). The US no 238 
net loss of wetlands policy includes both an overarching goal and programs for 239 
implementation (including trading losses of wetlands for credits purchased from wetland 240 
banks). The overarching goal implies a reference scenario of no further declines in the 241 
function and values of wetlands. However, in some US states, it is possible to allocate credits 242 
for protection of existing wetlands, though usually fewer per unit area than for wetland 243 
creation or restoration. So, while overarching policies tend to aim towards a fixed target, the 244 
impact-specific policies that form part of how they are implemented tend not to (Figure 2).  245 
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Reference scenarios for overarching and impact-specific NNL policies 246 
Given that there are different types of reference scenarios for NNL, broadly classifiable into 247 
fixed and dynamic (Figure 1), what type of reference scenario is suitable for different types of 248 
policies? We argue that because the intention and scope of overarching and impact-specific 249 
policies differ, different reference scenarios can be appropriateat least initially.  250 
Impact-specific NNL policies, such as those that include offsetting, are usually intended only 251 
to deal with the component of loss caused by the particular impact in question. Therefore, if it 252 
is likely that the state of target natural capital would be changing even in the absence of the 253 
impact and linked offsets (for example, due to unregulated impacts, climate change, invasive 254 
species, and unrelated conservation actions), then it is reasonable for the policy to be 255 
designed to achieve NNL relative to a dynamic reference scenario set to reflect that 256 
background rate of change. On the other hand, such a reference scenario makes little sense 257 
when applied in the context of an overarching policy (Figure 2). Overarching policies would 258 
normally be understood to be about a fixed, overall state of natural capital, encompassing all 259 
drivers of change, both positive and negative. This should be a desired statein effect, a 260 
target state.  261 
Reference scenario guides loss-gain accounting 262 
In the case of an impact-specific NNL policy, site-level reference scenarios are required to 263 
identify both the amount of loss from an impact, and the amount of gain from an offset. 264 
These losses and gains need to be measured relative to counterfactual scenariosthat is, what 265 
would happen to the target natural capital without the impact and the offset (also known as 266 
debiting baselines and crediting baselines; sensu 
13
). These counterfactual scenarios must 267 
be logically consistent with the reference scenario for the overall policy goal.  268 
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In any given situation, multiple counterfactual scenarios are possible. By definition, these 269 
scenarios can never be correct, and can only be an estimate of what the future would look 270 
like in the absence of some particular intervention. However, it can be consistent or 271 
inconsistent with the policys reference scenario, and be plausible or implausiblee.g., 272 
informed by recent trends that occurred under comparable circumstances, coupled with 273 
explicit assumptions about relevant physical, social, economic and institutional drivers 
15,29,38
. 274 
Therefore, some counterfactual scenarios are more appropriate than others. 275 
When developing counterfactual scenarios for use in calculating losses and gains, it is 276 
important to distinguish between impacts that are regulated by the relevant impact-specific 277 
NNL policy (Type 1 impacts), and impacts that are not regulated (Type 2 impacts) 
30
 (See 278 
Box 1).   279 
Type 1 impacts: These are negative impacts which will trigger the application of the NNL 280 
policy, such as a requirement for an offset, or positive impacts from activities associated with 281 
such an offset.  282 
Type 2 impacts: These impacts are not subject to the NNL policy and thus neither trigger a 283 
requirement for an offset, nor are contingent upon on offset being required.  284 
All factors that affect the target natural capital in the region in which the NNL policy is 285 
operating can therefore be classified as either Type 1 or Type 2 impacts. The importance of 286 
this distinction is that only Type 2 impacts should be included in the reference scenario for 287 
the given policy (and therefore be used in estimating offset gains resulting from avoiding 288 
losses) (Box 1). Type 1 impacts should not be included, as any negative Type 1 impacts 289 
would themselves generate offsets to achieve impact-specific NNL, so averting them would 290 
not result in biodiversity gains. For example, if a region is under pressure from extractive 291 
industries, and offsets would be required for these industry impacts, then protecting habitat 292 
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that would otherwise have been lost due to extractive industry impacts should not count as a 293 
gain: each and every impact of extraction would require an offset, resulting in NNL and thus 294 
nothing to avert 
39
. The imperfect operation of offset policies, of course, means this may not 295 
be the case in practicebut including Type 1 impacts in the counterfactual would further 296 
undermine the effectiveness of the policy 
30
.   297 
 298 
Overarching and impact-specific NNL policy goals interact  299 
For jurisdictions that have both impact-specific and overarching NNL policies (e.g., the 300 
European Union, Australia, the USA), there is often an implementation gap. An impact-301 
specific NNL policy, like biodiversity offsetting, cannot achieve an overarching goal of NNL 302 
when impacts other than those captured within the impact-specific policy persist. This is 303 
especially problematic when the impact-specific policy has a narrow scope, or allows the 304 
protection of existing habitat to generate offset credit (e.g., avoided loss offsets in Colombia; 305 
Figure 2). The net outcome from offset policies that allow avoided loss to count as a benefit 306 
in exchange for a loss is a decline in the target natural capital. Therefore, a jurisdiction with 307 
an overarching NNL goal as well as offset mechanisms that result in decline (i.e., have a 308 
reference scenario of decline) needs to address the gap between this rate of decline and the 309 
overarching NNL goal.  310 
The net outcomes of an impact-specific NNL policy contribute to the overall natural capital 311 
outcomes for the jurisdiction where the policy operates. The more types of impacts that the 312 
impact-specific NNL policy covers, the more influence its reference scenario will have on 313 
outcomes for the jurisdiction. Therefore, it is important that where a jurisdiction has an 314 
overarching policy goal of NNL as well as impact-specific NNL policies, the reference 315 
scenarios for the two are compatible. 316 
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If the reference scenario for an impact-specific NNL policy is one of decline, but the 317 
jurisdiction also has an overarching NNL policy that uses a fixed baseline (desired state) as a 318 
goal, then the cost of achieving that overarching goal shifts progressively from those 319 
responsible for the impacts, to society (Figure 3). This is because offsets for specific impacts 320 
would need only to counterbalance enough loss to maintain the declining reference scenario, 321 
but achieving the overarching goal of ceasing or reversing decline necessitates filling the gap 322 
through public investment. In such situations, traditional publicly-funded conservation 323 
policies will continue to be core to stemming environmental decline 
40
.  324 
Ideally, the counterfactuals used in impact-offset exchanges should distinguish between Type 325 
2 impacts (those that do not trigger an offset requirement) and Type 1 impacts (those that do).  326 
It is reasonable for public investment to be used to redress Type 2 impacts in pursuing the 327 
overarching NNL goal.  However, as public investment starts to address background declines, 328 
then this more favourable trend must be built into the reference scenarios used for impact-329 
specific policies. Otherwise, the public will pay more than their fair share (Figure 3).  330 
Other approaches for achieving the convergence of overarching and impact-specific policies 331 
are to expand the scope of impacts that require an offset as widely as possible, and explicitly 332 
reflect in the reference scenarios for such policies all independent activities that generate 333 
gains in natural capital  
26
. This in turn reduces the benefits able to be claimed from 334 
protection of existing natural capitalthat is, the avoided loss
41
because very few Type 2 335 
impacts remain. This would mean the reference scenario used for impact-specific NNL goals 336 
would converge on the overarching, fixed, reference scenario, and avoided loss would be 337 
possible in very limited circumstances 
30,41,42
. There are costs, however, to introducing such a 338 
comprehensive scope for an impact-specific NNL policy. Taxpayer-funded conservation 339 
policies may be more cost-effective at achieving an overarching NNL goal than requiring 340 
many small negative impacts to be offset individually, as this typically comes with high 341 
16 
 
transaction costs. For example, green taxes based on adequate proxies of biodiversity loss 342 
(e.g. on area, with rates that vary across localities as a function of biodiversity features) could 343 
be used to bridge the funding gap between impact-specific and overarching NNL policies 
43
.  344 
 345 
A way forward 346 
Clearly specifying reference scenarios is important for all NNL policies, including those that 347 
guide offsetting. Without them, the NNL goal is meaningless. Recognition of this need is 348 
increasingly urgent as the NNL concept continues to expand to areas beyond biodiversity 349 
outcomes, such as the concept of Land Degradation Neutrality
5
. We found little evidence 350 
that detailed reference scenarios are explicitly specified in a range of prominent NNL 351 
policies, and that the implementation of these policies can be inconsistent with their stated or 352 
implied intent.  353 
Apart from clarifying the intended goal and outcome of a NNL policy, a clearly stated 354 
reference scenario is required so that the design and implementation of the policy is 355 
consistent with achieving that outcome. In the case of an impact-offset exchange, consistency 356 
is required between site-level reference scenarios and the reference scenario for the overall 357 
policy goal. Otherwise, the net outcome from the exchange will not achieve the policys 358 
stated goal. When not all impacts are covered by impact-specific NNL policies, overarching 359 
NNL policies in the same jurisdiction need to specify how the gaps between the two NNL 360 
policies are to be filled to achieve intended outcomes, for example, through traditional 361 
publicly-funded conservation policies. 362 
Promoting a no net loss policy without explicit reference scenarios introduces the risk that 363 
pressure from economic and political interests can influence how the policy is implemented, 364 
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whilst appearing to maintain a clear standard 
4
. Policymakers may therefore be reluctant or 365 
unable to clearly specify counterfactual reference scenarios for NNL policies. Policies 366 
designed to achieve NNL should ensure: (i) clarity about how they interact with other goals 367 
and targets; (ii) transparency about the reference scenario at the overarching policy level; (iii) 368 
identification of the scope of impacts to which an impact-specific policy applies, so that Type 369 
1 and 2 impacts can be identified; and (iv) specification of how counterfactuals at the impact-370 
specific level should be calculated, such as excluding Type 1 impacts. 371 
At least in principle, NNL policies could have an important role to play in keeping humanity 372 
within a safe operating space 
1,2
. However, this depends upon many elements of policy design 373 
and implementation, starting with clearly defined and appropriate reference scenarios. 374 
Current NNL policies interpret the no net loss concept in vastly differentand, we argue, 375 
often inappropriateways, and so in many cases it is not clear what the outcome of these 376 
policies is intended to be.  377 
This complexity and confusion highlights the need for the compensatory component that is 378 
intrinsic to NNL policies to be the option of last resort, with avoidance of impacts the first 379 
priority (for example, as per the mitigation hierarchy
25,34
). In the meantime, NNL policies are 380 
increasingly adopted and implemented without clarity on what, how much and where natural 381 
capital is being lost in exchange for compensation that cannot easily be evaluated against 382 
intended outcomes. NNL policies, especially those that involve trading biodiversity and its 383 
components, are facing strident opposition from individuals and organisations on the basis of 384 
ethical, social, technical and governance concerns 
7,44,45
. Creating clarity about what such 385 
policies are intended to achieve will not satisfy most of these concerns, but it does set the 386 
yardstick by which policy performance can be judged.   387 
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Figure Legends 553 
Figure 1. Examples of potential trends in focal natural capital resulting from the 554 
implementation of no net loss policies (either overarching or impact-specific). The different 555 
types of reference scenarios shown include three fixed states (A) and two dynamic reference 556 
scenarios (B and C). Note that line B is parallel to the grey line depicting the background 557 
trend, which depicts the expected change in stocks of natural capital caused by various 558 
factors, including only impacts not targeted by the NNL policy.  The background trend is not 559 
necessarily one of decline. Assuming perfect implementation of the relevant NNL policy, the 560 
net outcome would match the reference scenario set for the policy. 561 
Figure 2. Reviewed overarching and impact-specific policies with stated NNL or similar 562 
goals mapped against their specified or effective reference scenario. Where a mismatch 563 
occurs between a policys stated reference scenario and its outcome based on the policys 564 
design, or there is uncertainty, the box overlaps both regions. 565 
Figure 3. Components of the cost of achieving an overarching reference scenario that 566 
constitutes a favourable target. In this case, the impact-specific reference scenario is in 567 
conflict with the overarching, desired reference scenario, and only part of the impacts of 568 
development (relative to the overarching reference scenario) are the responsibility of the 569 
proponent of the development. 570 
  571 
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Table 1. Overarching and impact-specific policies that seek to achieve NNL, net gain, net positive impact, net neutrality, zero net deforestation, 572 
and related goals. 573 
Policy name Jurisdiction/ 
location 
Status Stated/paraphrased NNL 
goal and target 
Stated/paraphrased reference 
scenario 
Effective reference scenario 









No net loss of biodiversity Current or desirable future state  16 
Zero Net Deforestation Global  In 
development/ 
adopted 
Zero net deforestation or 
decline in forest condition 





Global Adopted No net loss of land 
productive capacity  
Fixed at 2016 state  5 







No net reduction in forest 
land 
Fixed at 2015 forest area  17 
No net loss of 
Wetlands 
USA Adopted No overall net losses of 
wetland functions and 
values 
Current fixed state Fixed or declining scenario (in 
the few cases where protection 







Australia Adopted Improve or maintain the 
viability of matters of 
national environmental 
significance 
Dynamic scenario of business as 
usual if neither the impact nor the 
offset occurred 
Dynamic scenario, usually 
declining 
18 






Union habitat types that justify 
Natura 2000 status 
conservation status (which can be 
current or desired state depending 
on species or habitat types, and 
location) 
and implemented mainly 





France Adopted No net loss/net gain of 
nationally and sub-
nationally protected species 
and particular habitats  
Fixed state of favourable 
conservation/ecological status 
Fixed at current state 11,52 
Biodiversity offsetting 
(as part of the 
mitigation hierarchy) 
South Africa In draft No Net Loss of biodiversity 
up to specified limits of 
acceptable change 
Fixed minimum at desired future 
state (remedy residual negative 
impacts to ensure that national 








Maintaining or improving 
fishery productivity 







Adopted Improve or maintain the 
viability of matters of State 
Environmental Significance 
Dynamic scenario of business as 
usual if neither the impact nor the 
offset occurred 
Dynamic declining scenario 
(focus is on protection of 




Ghana In draft Compensate for biodiversity 
losses resulting from 
development projects 
Not specified Fixed current state  restoration 
only 
58 
Guide for the 
Compensation of 




Chile Adopted No net loss or net gain of 
biodiversity 
Not specified Dynamic declining scenario 59 
Offsets for Loss of Colombia Adopted No net loss of biodiversity Not specified when compared to Dynamic declining scenario 60 
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Biodiversity the base line  (protection and maintenance of 






Adopted An overall environmental 
gain 
Dynamic scenario of what would 
likely have occurred to the 
vegetation with development but 
without the policy 
Dynamic declining scenario 
(protection and maintenance of 





Global Adopted No net loss or net gain of 
biodiversity 
Dynamic scenario of business as 
usual if neither the impact nor 
offset occurred, declining 
permitted 







Company X proposes that Option 1 would achieve a net gain outcome under the NNL policy. Their calculation relies on a counterfactual 
scenario for the site: how many plants there would be if the site did not become an offset. They state that if they were not to protect 
this part of their lease through an offset, there is a high chance ʹ estimated at 80% ʹ that the site would be lost to mining (a Type 1 
impact), resulting in loss of all the threatened plants. The expected loss of plants without the offset is therefore 0.8 × 700 plants. By 
protecting the site from mining, however, all 700 plants would remain ʹ so Company X concludes that the offset benefit of avoiding the 
loss of 560 plants more than counterbalances the original impact (loss of 500 plants) and achieves NNL. 
Type 1 impacts are those impacts that trigger an impact-specific NNL policy; 
Type 2 impacts are those that do not. In a hypothetical landscape, a 
threatened plant population is declining due to two factors: impacts from 
mining, and livestock grazing. A NNL policy that aims to counterbalance 
impacts on threatened species applies to all new impacts from mining, but 
not to the ongoing impacts of grazing.  
Company X submits plans for a new mine that will impact 500 of the 
remaining threatened plants. It has two options to offset this impact. Option 
1 involves protecting another part of the mining lease, which supports 700 
individuals of the same plant, but might otherwise be mined in the future, 
resulting in the plants being lost. Option 2 is to purchase an adjoining 
property which has 600 of the threatened plants, but is subject to livestock 
grazing. Company X would remove the grazing in the hope that this will 
increase the plant population. 
 
Box 1. The problem with including Type 1 impacts in counterfactuals 
It is not valid for Company X to claim the benefit from the avoided loss of the offset site to mining (a Type 1 impact) because, according 
to the policy, any future mining at the site would also have been subject to a NNL requirement, and thus its own offset. The loss of 
the site would have to be counterbalanced elsewhere, with a gain of 700 plants required. Thus, the actual benefit of Option 1 is zero. 
Option 2, however, is a different story. The continuation of livestock grazing (a Type 2 impact) will cause the loss of 200 of the 
threatened plants, and its removal is 
expected to increase the population 
to 650. So, the benefit of Option 2 is 
avoidance of the loss of 200 plants, 
plus the increase of 50 plants ʹ a 
total benefit of 250 plants that 
would not otherwise exist. Option 2 
provides only half the benefit 
required for a NNL outcome, 
meaning that Company X would 
need to implement additional offsets 
ʹ but it is a much more beneficial 
offset than Option 1, which 
incorrectly included the avoidance of 
Type 1 impacts in their calculation of 
benefit.  
An hypothetical plant species threatened by both 











NNL policy introduced 
B.  NNL compared to without impacts targeted by 
the policy (background trajectory) 
A. NNL compared to a fixed value 
C.  NNL compared to without the policy (but 
with development impacts) 
Fixed reference scenarios 
Dynamic reference scenarios 
Denotes parallel lines 
Form of reference 






Better than current 
state 
Same as current 
state 







(B) Excluding both 
impacts targeted by 
the NNL policy and 
linked actions 
 
(C) Without NNL 
















































scenario (=target trend) 
Impact-specific 
reference scenario 
Private cost 
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